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Abstract 
 
This paper examines an equity portfolio comprised of publicly traded firms that serve as the 
primary sponsor of a NASCAR race team to determine whether such a “specialty fund” 
could diversify risk as effectively as a more carefully chosen portfolio.  We calculate risk 
adjusted return measures and find that the NASCAR portfolio consistently outperforms 
market benchmarks.  We also find that over longer time periods (greater than three years) 
the constructed portfolio exhibits lower risk than a market benchmark.  We contend that 
NASCAR sponsorship may serve as a signal to the market of a firm’s financial health. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 While investors develop portfolios with a few primary objectives in mind (namely to 
reduce unsystematic risk and/or to enhance portfolio returns) there are often underlying 
objectives of secondary importance.  As an example, socially responsible funds attract 
investors who seek to align their personal investment strategies with their religious, social, or 
political beliefs.  The funds have become extremely popular since the first such fund was 
introduced in 1971.  In addition, there are many other “specialty” funds that invest solely in 
sectors, such as multimedia, energy, financial, healthcare, leisure industry, life science, etc.   
 
 In this paper we developed a specialty fund comprised only of firms that serve as a 
primary sponsor for cars in the top racing series of the National Association of Stock Car 
Racing (NASCAR), what is now known as the Sprint Cup Series.  NASCAR popularity has 
skyrocketed in recent years and the sport enjoys tremendous fan support and loyalty.  We 
compare the risk-adjusted return performance of this portfolio with that of more established 
benchmarks.  This paper has broad importance and practical significance in that investors 
may be better able to earn higher risk-adjusted returns by including this specialty fund in 
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their asset allocation strategy.  This paper will also provide insight into whether targeted 
diversification (by investing in a range of firms that have some common denominator) can be 
effective in reducing portfolio risk. 
 
 Over the last several years NASCAR sanctioned auto racing has become one of the 
most popular spectator sports in the United States.  This is particularly true of race events at 
the body’s top level, Sprint (formerly Winston, formerly Nextel) Cup.  NASCAR is a 
sponsor-driven sport with the cars, drivers, and crew adorned with the colors and logos of a 
number of sponsors.  Fortune Magazine reported that for 2004, NASCAR had sponsorship 
revenue of $1.5 billion, more than the National Football League and Major League Baseball 
combined (O’Keefe, 2005).  In addition to monetary investment by the automobile 
companies, sponsors are drawn from a wide range of products including alcohol (Budweiser, 
Miller Lite and Coors Lite are long-time sponsors), home and consumer products (Tide, 
M&M’s, Office Depot) as well as building supplies (Home Depot, Lowe’s and DeWalt). 
 
 This paper seeks to answer three portfolio related questions using financial data from 
firms who sponsor NASCAR race cars.  First, is it possible to build a simple investment 
portfolio of publicly traded companies who invest in sponsoring NASCAR race cars and 
outperform established benchmarks on a risk-adjusted basis?  Second, is it possible for the 
NASCAR portfolio to diversify risk as effectively as a more broad selection of stocks?  
Finally, does full vs. partial sponsorship lead to differences in excess returns?  We hope to 
use the answers to these three questions to provide insight into whether sponsorship serves as 
a signal for strong companies. 
 
II. Sponsorship Basics 
 
 There are many ways for a company to be involved in NASCAR racing.  In this paper 
we focus on those companies who have chosen to be the primary sponsor of a race car at 
some point during a NASCAR Sprint Cup racing season.  An online article posted on Jeff 
Gordon’s official website provides a user friendly overview of sponsorship (Jeff Gordon 
online, 2005).  The cost for the primary sponsor position on a car, which provides space on 
both rear quarter panels of the car, hood, team transporter, and team uniforms, ranges 
between $8 million and $21 million per year.  Primary sponsors also typically pay for 
signage at the track as well as hospitality and other related costs, some of which may double 
sponsor financial involvement (O’Keefe et al. 2005). 
 
 Even at these costs, firms are eager to contribute.  Part of this can be attributed to the 
unique role sponsors have in racing.  Unlike most televised sports where sponsor messages 
are secondary to the telecast of the event, the telecast of the race provides air time for the 
sponsors.  Each time a car is shown on television the sponsors receive on-air exposure.  One 
return on a sponsor’s investment is this “free” television exposure.  Joyce Julius and 
Associates, Inc. estimated that Lowe’s received nearly $20 million of in-broadcast exposure 
during the 2006 Daytona 500 won by Jimmie Johnson, who drives the car sponsored by 
Lowe’s (Joyce Julius and Associates, Inc., 2006). An estimated $11.6 million of this came 
from the display of the primary sponsor logo on the hood of the car.  On average, primary 
sponsors received $1.4 million in television broadcast race exposure for each of the 36 races 
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in the 2005 season. Additionally, merchandise sold to the fans typically also includes the 
sponsor’s name and colors as part of the merchandise. 
 
 Market research has also shown that NASCAR fans are quite loyal to the brands that 
sponsor their favorite driver.  Prior to their entry into NASCAR sponsorship, Office Depot 
found that “forty four percent of NASCAR fans who shopped at a competitor would switch 
to Office Depot” as a result of their sponsorship of a car (Daniel, 2006).  O’Keefe et al. 
reported that Home Depot saw a double-digit increase in ladder sales after offering a 10% 
discount to anyone who brought in an ad featuring Tony Stewart climbing the fence at the 
Daytona Motor Speedway after a July 2005 victory at the track.  (The ad copy read “Hey 
Tony, we have ladders”). 
 
 That advertising dollars translate into economic benefits for firm shareholders is well 
documented. Reilly, McGann, and Marquardt find a positive relationship between substantial 
advertising expenditures and the relative wealth position of the firm’s owners (Reilly, 
McGann, and Marquardt, 1977). Schonfeld and Boyd report that corporate advertising has a 
positive and statistically significant effect on stock prices (Schonfeld and Boyd, 1982). They 
find that it is advertising that affects stock prices, not vice versa.  Further, their results are 
robust and are consistent over two different time periods. 
 
Ben-Zion used a regression framework to highlight the effect of advertising dollars on 
returns to shareholders (Ben-Zion, 1978). He regressed advertising and promotions dollars on 
current stock price. He concluded that the estimated coefficient represents the present value 
of future cash inflows attributed to this period’s advertising and promotion dollars.  Erickson 
and Jacobson propose an information asymmetry argument (Erickson and Jacobson, 1992). 
They suggest that increases in a firm’s advertising and promotions budget may send a 
positive signal to the market that the firm has discretionary cash flows available for such 
expenditures. 
 
Other studies have employed an event student methodology  to document capital 
market reactions that result from specific marking events such as slogan changes, brand 
introductions, and celebrity endorsements (Agrawal and Kamakura 1995)(Conchar, Kinkhan, 
and Bodkin 2003)(Kim and Morris 2003)(Mathur and Mathur 1995, 1996, 2000)(Mathur, 
Mathur, and Rangan 1997)(Lane and Jacobson 1995).  These and other studies document the 
positive relationship that exists between levels of adverting and promotional spending and 
the market value of the firm. Marketing activities (specifically advertising and promotions 
spending) are generally expected to deliver future positive cash flows and result in increases 
in shareholder wealth. 
 
III.   Methodology and Data 
 
 To carry out this analysis we examine several equally-weighted portfolios consisting 
of equity from all publicly traded firms who sponsored cars at the Sprint Cup level of 
NASCAR in the years 2000-2005, regardless of the level or amount of sponsorship.  (During 
the time period under consideration the Sprint Cup Series was known as the Winston Cup 
Series).  The investment strategy in each portfolio is to purchase and hold equity in the firms 
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who are the primary sponsor in at least one race during the purchase year.  Our analysis 
consists of six, five, four, three, two, and one-year holding periods.  For multi-year holding 
periods the portfolios were re-balanced each year (by dropping and adding firms) to include 
only those firms active in sponsorship for the new season. Thus, the two year holding period 
(2004-2005) includes all of the firms active in sponsorship for the 2004 season, and all of the 
firms active in sponsorship for the 2005 season. Specifically, if a firm was active in 
sponsorship for both years, then its return was used in the calculation of the portfolio return 
for both years.  If a firm sponsored races in 2004 but did not continue to do so in 2005, then 
the firm’s return was used to calculate the portfolio return for 2004 only.  If the firm did not 
sponsor races in 2004 but did so in 2005, then its return was used to calculate the portfolio 
return for 2005 only.  In most cases, firms continue to sponsor cars year after year. However, 
our portfolio construction ensures that firms who drop out of sponsorship are not erroneously 
included in risk and return measures for multi-year holding periods.  For each portfolio, we 
calculate risk-adjusted return measures. We will examine the monthly returns of holding this 
portfolio from purchase on the first trading day of the month until the last trading day of the 
month.  The risk and annualized return results of these portfolios are compared to results 
from larger equity index measures.  We ignore transactions costs in the computation of rates 
of return. 
 
 The data consist of stock price data collected for all of the publicly traded companies 
which served as the primary sponsor of a NASCAR Sprint Cup car during the period 2000-
2005.  The data on NASCAR sponsorship details on a race-by-race basis was taken from race 
information at www.racing-reference.info.  Returns were calculated using the adjusted share 
prices for a given company.  The historical prices used were the monthly adjusted closing 
prices provided by Commodity Systems Inc. and reported by finance.yahoo.com, which 
represented the closing price for a particular company on the last day of every month, 
specifically adjusted for dividends and splits.   
 
IV. Results 
 
 Monthly returns were calculated for each firm that sponsored at least one car (for any 
number of races) during the racing season.  The number of firms comprising the sample for 
each period of observation are reported in Table 1. 
 
 For each period, the compound annual return was calculated, as well as the portfolio 
standard deviation and beta.  Summary statistics may be found in Table 2. 
 
The results indicate that the NASCAR portfolio consistently earned higher returns 
than the S&P 500.  Additionally for the two longest holding periods, the NASCAR portfolio 
had a lower standard deviation than did the S&P 500.  For shorter periods, the S&P 500 had a 
much lower standard deviation.  Additionally portfolio beta suggests that for longer holding 
periods the NASCAR portfolio is less volatile than the market.  It is reasonable that a small 
sample of firms would be more volatile in the short run than a larger market basket.  There 
was a statistically significant difference in the returns between the portfolio for both the 
2000-2005 period and the 2001-2005 period regardless of how standard deviations were 
calculated.  When the monthly standard deviations were annualized the 2002-2005 and the 
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2003-2005 periods also saw a statistically significant difference between the NASCAR 
portfolio and the S&P 500.  It is not surprising that t-statistics became smaller the shorter the 
time period under consideration. 
 
 To assess the risk-adjusted performance of the two portfolios three widely-recognized 
measures were calculated.  They include the Sharpe ratio, Treynor measure, and alpha 
(Sharpe, 1966)(Treynor, 1965)(Jensen, 1969).  Investors and financial advisors find these 
tools to be useful when ranking portfolios in terms of their risk-adjusted performance.  
 
 The Sharpe measure is the ratio of excess portfolio return divided by the portfolio 
standard deviation.  It is a relative mea  -adjusted performance: sure of risk
  ܵ ൌ
ோುି ோ೑
ఙು
 
      (1) 
 
In this measure, Rp is the return from our NASCAR portfolio while Rf represents the risk-free 
rate of return. We use the return on a 90-day Treasury bill as our measure of risk-free returns.  
The σp in the denominator is the standard deviation of the NASCAR portfolio. 
 
 The Treynor measure is also a relative measure of risk-adjusted performance. The 
numerator is identical to that of the Sharpe ratio, that is, portfolio return in excess of the risk-
free rate of return.  The denominator, h r the portfolio beta coefficient:  oweve , is 
  ܶ ൌ
ோುି ோ೑
ఉು
 
       (2) 
The difference in the two performance measures, therefore, is that the Sharpe ratio adjusts for 
total risk (measured by standard deviation) while the Treynor measure adjusts for market risk 
only (measured by beta).  
 
 Jensen’s alpha is an absolute measure of risk-adjusted performance.  Alpha is 
estimated through a regression n excess market returns:   of excess portfolio return o
 ܧܴ௣௧ ൌ ן௣൅ ߚ௣ܧܴ௠௧ ൅ ߝ௣௧     (3) 
 
 
where ERpt is the excess portfolio return (this is the return on the portfolio in month t minus 
the risk-free rate during month t); βp is the portfolio beta, ERmt is the excess return on the 
market portfolio during month t, εpt is the residual term during month t, and αp is the risk-
adjusted excess return earned over the time period. 
 
 Following Reilly and Norton, we also computed another performance measurement 
tool that is a variation of the traditional Sharpe ratio (Reilly and Norton, 2003).  The New 
Sharpe ratio examines the differential tu n  o  portfolio against its benchmark. re r s f a
 ܵҧ ൌ ோುି ோ೘೟
ఙವ
 
      (4) 
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where Rpt is the portfolio return in month t, Rmt is the return on the market portfolio during 
month t, and σD is the standard deviation of the differential return over the time period.  Like 
Jensen’s alpha, this is an absolute measure of risk-adjusted performance.  This measure 
allows for direct comparison against a benchmark portfolio.  They differ, however, in that 
Jensen’s alpha adjusts for systematic risk while the new Sharpe ratio adjusts for total risk. 
 
 Table 3 reports the risk-adjusted performance measures for the six periods observed. 
 
 Both of our relative measures indicate that the NASCAR portfolio outperformed our 
market benchmark in all six periods of analysis. Our absolute measures of performance also 
indicate that on a risk adjusted excess return basis the NASCAR portfolio typically 
outperforms the market portfolio.  It should be noted that for the three shortest portfolio 
periods Jensen’s Alpha was not statistically different from zero. 
 
 Over the time period of our analysis some firms (such as Budweiser) consistently 
sponsored a car.  Others engaged in a partial sponsorship plan in which they shared the 
primary sponsor role with other companies.  Office Depot’s previously mentioned 
sponsorship of Carl Edwards would be an example.  In addition, some firms made very brief 
appearances sponsoring cars on a very infrequent, inconsistent basis.  We would like to know 
whether excess returns to sponsoring firms are related to the decision to sponsor a car at all, 
or whether full season sponsorship is required to see excess returns.  To facilitate the 
comparison, the following regression was estimated on the periods of observation:   
 
ܴ௧כ ൌ  ߙ ൅ ߙכ ܦ௦௧ ൅  ߚܴ௠௧ ൅ ߜ௜ܻ݁ܽݎ௜ ൅ ݁௧   (5) 
 
where 
 
R*t =  the stacked vector of company excess returns (return in excess of the risk-free rate) 
Dst =  shift dummy variable that takes on a value of 0 if the firm sponsored all races, 1 if the 
firm sponsored less than 100% of the races 
Rmt = excess market returns (market return minus the risk-free rate) 
α* =  the shift in the estimate of excess returns due to the firm sponsoring less than all of 
the races 
β* = a measure of the firm’s systematic risk  
Yeari = a dummy variable for the year i where i ranges from 2000 to 2004.   
 
In the data 1,968 observations come from firms which sponsored all the races while ninety 
six (96) observations are from firms which engaged in partial sponsorship.  The results from 
this regression are reported in Tables 4 and 5. 
 
 The coefficient on the dummy variable for partial sponsorship is positive and 
statistically significant and indicates that firms which sponsor a team for some, but not all, of 
the races in a season have excess returns 1.98 percentage points higher than those firms that 
sponsor a car for the entire season.  As expected, the coefficient for excess market returns is 
positive and statistically significant.  This outcome supports the market model that argues 
that the returns on a security are linearly related to the returns on a market portfolio.   
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 We have included dummy variables for each year, omitting 2005, to control for any 
year specific effects on return levels.  With the exception of 2002 none of these dummy 
variables are statistically significant. 
 
These results suggest that firms who sponsor a car for less than a full season earn a 
higher excess return than those firms who sponsor a car for the entire season.  This suggests 
that excess returns are a pre-cursor to a firm sponsoring a NASCAR car.  This would lend 
credence to the idea that firms that enter into race sponsorship agreements are in fact strong 
firms relative to others in the market and that sponsorship may serve as a signal of a firm’s 
financial health.   
 
To test whether these results are affected by the racing season we also estimated the 
model using a dummy variable for observations in the months of December and January 
when there are no NASCAR races. 1 This dummy variable was not statistically significant 
and its inclusion did not qualitatively change the coefficient estimates presented above.  
Additionally we estimated a model containing a dummy variable indicating that the sponsors 
car finished in the top five in points in the previous year.  The coefficient on this dummy 
variable was also not statistically significant. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
 With this paper we hoped to answer three portfolio related questions.  First, is it 
possible to build a simple investment portfolio which will outperform established 
benchmarks on a risk-adjusted basis?  Our analysis using relative and absolute risk 
performance measures suggests the answer to this question is yes.  The NASCAR portfolio 
outperformed the S&P 500 in all periods using relative measures, and nine of twelve cases 
using absolute measures. 
 
 Second, can the NASCAR portfolio diversify risk as effectively as a more broad 
selection of stocks.  Here our results were mixed.  The NASCAR portfolio has a portfolio 
beta of less than one and a lower standard deviation than the S&P 500 for the 2000-2005 and 
the 2001-2005 time periods.  For shorter time periods the portfolio beta is greater than one, 
and the portfolio standard deviation is higher than that for the S&P 500. 
 
These are important results as the equity which makes up our NASCAR portfolio was 
not chosen based on careful financial analysis, but instead because of their participation in 
race sponsorship.  That a portfolio constructed in this way can lower risk beyond the market 
benchmark over relatively short (three years and beyond) periods is a quite interesting 
finding. 
 
 Finally, we wanted to know whether NASCAR sponsorship was a signal for excess 
returns.  Our results may also suggest that sponsorship serves as a signal of high performing 
firms.  This would suggest that firms that self-select into NASCAR sponsorship do so in part 
 
1In 2001 the season began on February 11 and continued to November 23. 
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because of the potential gains in customer loyalty, but that these firms were likely already in 
solid financial shape prior to entering into sponsorship agreements.  As a result, higher risk 
adjusted returns are not likely caused by sponsorship, but sponsorship signals firms that are 
already likely to earn higher returns.  The result that even brief sponsorship leads to excess 
returns would lend credence to this view. 
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Table 1:   
Number of Public Companies as Primary Car Sponsors in Each Portfolio 
 
          Year      Number 
2000-2005                  26 
2001-2005             32 
2002-2005             30 
2003-2005             29 
2004-2005           27 
2005              28 
 
 
Table 2:  
Risk and Return Measures: NASCAR Portfolio vs. S&P 500 
 
Period  Compound Annual Return Standard Deviation  NASCAR  
  NASCAR S&P 500 NASCAR S&P 500 Portfolio Beta 
 
2000-2005 0.0793 * -0.0268 ** 0.370  0.372  0.826 
 
2001-2005 0.0945 * -0.0112** 0.330  0.333  0.878 
 
2002-2005 0.1079 *   0.0211 0.300  0.270  1.015 
 
2003-2005 0.1696 *   0.1237 0.218  0.158  1.281 
 
2004-2005 0.0879    0.0595 0.145  0.105  1.212 
 
2005          0.0301               0.0300 0.124  0.078  1.475 
 
Note: 
The * indicates that the difference between the NASCAR return and the S&P 500 return is statistically different from zero at 
the 10% level (two-tailed) using annualized standard deviations. 
 
The ** indicates that the difference between the NASCAR return and the S&P 500 return is statistically different from zero 
at the 10% level (two-tailed) using normalized standard deviations. 
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Table 3:   
Risk-adjusted Return Measures, NASCAR Portfolio and S&P 500 
 
 
 Sharpe Ratio Treynor Ratio Jensen’s 
Alpha 
New 
Sharpe 
Period NASCAR S&P 500 NASCAR S&P 500 NASCAR NASCAR
       
2000-2005  0.1413 -0.1448  0.0632 -0.0539 0.008007 0.040 
       
2001-2005  0.2229 -0.0965  0.0837 -0.0321 0.008239 0.054 
       
2002-2005  0.3008  0.0124  0.0888  0.0033 0.006976 0.058 
       
2003-2005  0.6931  0.6665  0.1180  0.1053 0.001256* 0.040 
       
2004-2005  0.4497  0.3527  0.0539  0.0370 0.001722* 0.033 
       
2005 -0.0111 -0.0185 -0.0009 -0.0014 0.000302* 0.006 
*Alphas not significantly different from zero for the  periods 2003-2005, 2004-2005,2005 
Table 4: 
 Regression Statistics for Excess Returns Model 
 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.397 
R Square 0.157 
Adjusted R Square 0.154 
Standard Error 0.085 
Observations 2,064 
 
Table 5:  
Regression Results for Excess Returns Model 
 
 Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept -0.0003 0.0046 -0.07 0.944 
Partial Sponsor Dummy 0.0198 0.0093 2.13 0.033 
Excess Market Returns 0.8387 0.0448 19.69 0.000 
Year 2000 0.0070 0.0068 1.04 0.300 
Year 2001 0.0094 0.0065 1.44 0.148 
Year 2002 0.0131 0.0066 1.99 0.046 
Year 2003 0.0096 0.0066 1.45 0.147 
Year 2004 0.0058 0.0067 0.87 0.386 
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